Prof.Kenneth Westphal -University of East Anglia
‘Newton’s Rule Four of Philosophy and Scientific Realism’
Newton’s Rule 4 of (experimental) Philosophy is central to his justification of his causal realism about gravity, and to his rejection of Cartesian physics. I show that Newton’s Rule 4 embeds and is strongly supported by a semantics of singular cognitive reference, which I develop from Evans (1975), ‘Identity and Predication’. This semantics of singular cognitive reference justifies fallibilism about empirical justification and thereby defends Newton’s Rule 4 and Newton’s causal realism against van Fraassen’s original version of Constructive Empiricism. Come find out why and how this matters to our (mis)understanding of science
Tuesday 20th March
Seminar Room, Department of Humanities and Social Science, Faculty of Science and Letters, Istanbul Technical University, Ayazağı Campus (on the Metro line from Taksim. Strictly speaking the campus is in Maslak, not Ayazağı!).